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The British Constitution and Post-Referendum Scotland: A Personal Comment 
Aileen McHarg, Professor of Public Law, University of Strathclyde 
The three years leading up to the independence referendum was the most exhilarating and 
exhausting period of my academic career.  It was a hugely busy time: attending, organising and 
speaking at events; reading and writing about the implications of referendum; trying to keep up with 
the voluminous literature; and engaging in discussion, both on- and off-line.  But it was an immense 
privilege to be able to observe and participate in such a momentous constitutional debate; an 
extraordinary learning experience both as regards the current governance of Scotland and the 
possibilities for change; and a wonderful opportunity to forge new connections within academia and 
beyond.   
It was also sometimes an uncomfortable experience, raising the question of how and where to draw 
the line between participation in the constitutional debate as an academic observer and as a citizen 
with a vote to cast and strong feelings on the subject.  Some academics seemed untroubled by any 
such conflict, apparently perfectly happy to use their academic credentials to promote their political 
beliefs.  For myself, though, I found it difficult to reconcile the demands of academic engagement 
and transparency, on the one hand, with the expectations of academic detachment and even-
handedness, on the other.  It was only relatively late in the process that I publicly declared my 
support for the Yes campaign.  By that stage my desire as a citizen to do what I could to promote the 
cause had overcome my fear as an academic of reputational damage from abandoning an avowedly 
neutral stance.  But even so, I was careful to avoid (I hope) claiming greater expertise than I actually 
possessed, and unwilling to defend positions that I did not believe to be justifiable.  I also remained 
acutely conscious of the limited contribution to the debate that legal academics could make.  
Certainly, there were legal issues to be addressed on the path to independence, but the idea that 
there was a legal case to be made either for or against independence struck me as particularly 
absurd.  The choice to be made was an irreducibly political one, and any legal difficulties (for 
iŶƐƚĂŶĐĞ ?ĂƐƌĞŐĂƌĚƐĂŶŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?ƐŵĞmbership of the European Union) were also likely 
to be resolved politically. 
That said, it was ultimately impossible to divorce my personal and professional responses to the 
referendum.  Having started out undecided on the referendum question, my gradual shift towards 
support for independence was to a large extent informed by my analysis of the problematic nature 
ŽĨ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?ƐĐƵƌƌĞŶƚĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ Was a minority nation within a state which struggles to 
make sense of its multi-national nature  W and my inability to see a satisfactory solution to it short of 
independence.  /ŶĚĞĞĚ ?ĨĂƌĨƌŽŵƌĞƐŽůǀŝŶŐƚŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŽĨ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?ƐĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůĨƵƚƵƌĞ ?ŵǇƐĞŶƐĞ
is that the independence referendum has served to intensify constitutional dissatisfaction within 
Scotland (and beyond) and made it harder to resolve.  Not only did the fact of the referendum 
endorse the idea of Scotland as a self-determining political unit, but the largely negative terms in 
which the No campaign was conducted did little to build a positive defence of the United Kingdom as 
a state. 
Although the referendum ultimately produced a clear victory for the No campaign, it does not  W 
three months later  W feel like a defeat for the independence cause.  On the contrary, the 45% Yes 
vote was a significant achievement given that the level of support for independence was consistently 
around 25% to 30% at the beginning of the campaign.  Moreover, since 18 September, there has 
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been an extraordinary surge in support for pro-independence parties, and recent opinion polls show 
increased support for independence.  Constitutional questions continue to dominate public debate 
in Scotland, and Scottish and UK politics remain considerably disengaged.  In these circumstances, it 
seems to be a major challenge to rebuild the legitimacy of the UK state in Scotland, and to find a 
lasting constitutional settlement that will satisfy public opinion in Scotland, without (further) 
alienating public opinion elsewhere in the UK. 
The No vote in the referendum does not, of course, mean that there will be no constitutional 
change.  One of the ironies of the campaign was that  W having ruled out a second question on 
further devolution as being constitutionally inappropriate  W the Unionist parties found themselves 
obliged to promise that a No vote did not mean a vote for the status quo.  Thus, immediately after 
the referendum, the UK government set up the Smith Commission to consider further powers for 
the Scottish Parliament, as well as launching a process to consider the implications of devolution for 
the governance of England.  Separate processes for reforming devolution in Wales and Northern 
Ireland are also underway.  However, it is hard to be optimistic about the long-term implications of 
these reform initiatives. 
One problem is that the processes are highly disjointed.  Asymmetry has been a persistent feature of 
devolution in the UK; each devolution settlement (and the lack of it in England) has developed 
separately, in response to the distinctive needs and desires of the national unit in question.  While 
this is understandable, and in many ways desirable, the implications for the UK as a whole are 
potentially highly problematic.  This is because there is no sense of an overall constitutional re-
settlement.  There has been no explicit rethinking of the nature of the state to accommodate its 
multi-layered and increasingly differentiated system of government, while the fragmentation of the 
devolution process(es) means that the focus is on the distinctive governance needs of the 
constituent parts of the state, rather than on what binds them together.  The lack of any coherent 
reimagining of the territorial constitution also makes it less likely that the individual reform 
processes will succeed.  Without some broad equivalence in the governance arrangements in all four 
constituent nations the so-ĐĂůůĞĚ  ?tĞƐƚ >ŽƚŚŝĂŶ YƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ?  W the question why MPs from devolved 
nations should vote on English-only matters in the UK Parliament  W is impossible to resolve 
satisfactorily, and is therefore likely to remain a source of resentment.  Similarly, without 
abandoning the theory of the unlimited sovereignty of the Westminster Parliament, the Smith 
ŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?s recommendation that the Scottish Parliament be made permanent and the Sewel 
Convention (the principle that the UK Parliament will not exercise its legal power to legislate on 
devolved matters without the consent of the relevant devolved legislature) made legally binding is 
impossible to guarantee, again risking constitutional discontent.  Asymmetry also creates apparent 
anomalies, and therefore an inbuilt tendency to instability, as each devolved nation seeks to catch 
up with the most powerful.  For instance, there may be good reasons why the UK government has 
agreed to devolve corporation tax to Northern Ireland, yet the Smith Commission has ruled out its 
devolution to Scotland, but it may be difficult to convince a Scottish public with an appetite for 
extensive autonomy that this is anything other than contradictory. 
As far as the proposals for further devolution to Scotland are concerned, the recommendations 
made by the Smith Commission are generous from some perspectives.  They go beyond what any of 
the Unionist parties had proposed before the referendum and, if implemented, will make the 
Scottish Parliament one of the most powerful sub-national legislatures in the world.  Nevertheless, it 
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seems unlikely that the proposals will satisfy Scottish demands for autonomy.  This risk is 
exacerbated by the fact that Commission report itself  W produced in unseemly haste through a 
process of inter-party bargaining  W has no coherent story to tell about how and why powers should 
be divided between the Scottish and UK levels.  Like much of the referendum debate, the report is 
outcome driven: powers are recommended for devolution to enable the Scottish Parliament to 
achieve particular policy outcomes rather than on any principled basis.  This again creates anomalies 
and is likely to lead to tensions in future, as the constraints on the ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚWĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ?ƐůĞŐŝƐůative 
freedom become apparent.  The élite-dominated, rushed, and exclusively Scottish nature of the 
process also leaves the implementation of the proposals after the 2015 General Election vulnerable 
to attack both from those (such as some English MPs) who would prefer less radical reform (or even 
none at all) and from those (such as a potentially enlarged group of SNP MPs) who would prefer 
more.   
However, perhaps the greatest problem with the Smith Commission proposals, assuming they are 
implemented, is that any further increase in the powers of the Scottish Parliament, bringing with it 
additional policy differentiation between Scotland and the rest of the UK, risks simply reinforcing the 
sense that Scotland is semi-detached from the UK.  The strong probability, in my opinion, is that, far 
from creating a lasting constitutional settlement, post-referendum reform of devolution in Scotland 
will prove merely to be another step on the road to eventual independence.  Such an outcome is not 
inevitable, but to avert it would require a far more radical change in the constitutional arrangements 
and territorial politics of the UK than is, or seems likely to be, on offer.  If only incremental and 
piecemeal reform is possible, then the question is not if, but when and in what circumstances 
another independence referendum will take place. 
